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COMMENTS 
CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE "GOODS OR 
SERVICES" TEST 
The term "trade or business" is used frequently throughout the 
Internal Revenue Code, and the determination of whether a tax-
payer's activities constitute a trade or business has a major im-
pact on the applicable tax treatment. Unfortunately, lJO 
definition of trade or business is supplied in the Internal Revenue 
Code, the legislative history, or the Treasury Regulations. Con-
sequently, the courts have been left this task and two different 
standards for determining trade or business status have emerged. 
In this comment, the author reviews the history of the term 
"trade or business, " examines the decisional law, and analyzes 
the two current tests for determining whether a taxpayer is en-
gaged in a trade or business. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The determination of whether a taxpayer is "carrying on any trade 
or business" has a major impact upon the tax treatment of his income 
producing activities. For instance, the extent to which expenses· and bad 
debts2 may be deducted, the ability to carryover/carryback net operating 
losses,3 the availability of the business assets "write Off,"4 the use of the 
home office deduction,5 the characterization of gains and losses from 
property transactions,6 and the assessment of self-employment taxes7 all 
turn upon this determination. Despite the importance of distinguishing 
trade or business activities from other kinds of activities entered into for 
profit, neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations 
supply a general definition of what constitutes a trade or business. 8 
To identify those profit motivated activities9 which rise to the level 
I. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). 
2. Id. § 166(d)(2). 
3. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4) (West Supp. 1985). 
4. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1) (1982). 
5. Id. § 280A(c). 
6. /d. § 1221(2). 
7. /d. § l402(a). 
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
9. Section 183 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) severely limits the deductions 
available to an activity not engaged in for profit. I.R.C. § 183 (1982). Therefore, the 
initial determination in a trade or business inquiry is whether the taxpayer engaged 
in the activity with the objective of earning a profit. Treasury Regulation section 
1.183-2(b) lists several factors relevant to this determination, none of which is con-
sidered dispositive: the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; the 
expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; the time and effort expended by the tax-
payer in carrying on the activity; the expectation that assets used in the activity may 
appreciate in value; the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dis-
similar activities; the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activ-
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of a trade or business, courts have traditionally required the taxpayer to 
pass two tests: the "goods or services" test and the "facts and circum-
stances" test. to To satisfy the "goods or services" test, the taxpayer must 
prove that he held himself out as engaged in the selling of goods or serv-
ices. 11 Under the "facts and circumstances" test, courts analyze such 
factors as the extent, regularity, and continuity of the taxpayer's activi-
ties to determine whether the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or 
business. 12 
The continuing vitality of the two-test approach to defining a trade 
or business has been challenged in recent decisions rendered by the 
United States Tax Court 13 and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 14 In a sharp break with precedent, the Tax Court 
became the first court to reject the "goods or services" test. 15 The court 
rejected the test as being unduly restrictive and in conflict with Supreme 
Court precedent.16 In addition to the reasons offered by the Tax Court, 
the Seventh Circuit found the "goods or services" test to be misfocused 
and of little value as an analytical tool. 17 The Tax Court and the Seventh 
Circuit have retained the "facts and circumstances" test as their sole cri-
terion for determining trade or business status and thus have created the 
opportunity for more activities to be considered a trade or business. 
This comment reviews the history of the term "trade or business" 
under past and present Internal Revenue Codes. The discussion surveys 
cases considering the "goods or services" test and analyzes the reasoning 
offered as support for, and against, its continued use. Finally, this com-
ment concludes that the "goods or services" requirement should be re-
tained as a criterion in determining trade or business status because that 
ity; the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; the financial status of 
the taxpayer; and the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.183-2(b) (1972). 
10. See, e.g., Steffens v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 478, 482-83 (lIth Cir. 1983) (court 
held taxpayer passed "goods or services" test, then examined extent and regularity 
of taxpayer's purported business activities); Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326, 
329 (5th Cir. 1968) (trade or business refers to more than mere profit motivated 
activity; it refers to substantial and repeated activity by which the taxpayer holds 
himself out as selling goods or services); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 
(3d Cir.) (trade or business status requires a taxpayer to hold himself out as selling 
goods or services and to engage in extensive activity over a substantial period of 
time), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). 
11. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
12. E.g., Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1982); Reese v. Com-
missioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1980); Meredith v. Commissioner, 49 T.e.M. 
(CCH) 318,321 (1984). 
13. See, e.g., Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 793, 797-803 (1984), affd, 771 F.2d 
269 (7th Cir. 1985); Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 362, 369-71 (1983). 
14. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985). 
15. One court referred to the "goods or services" test as settled law prior to Ditunno. 
Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 88 (1984). 
16. Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 362, 366-71 (1983). 
17. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 277. 
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requirement is consistent with the maxims of statutory construction and 
offers the pragmatic benefit to both taxpayers and courts of providing a 
clear and rational basis upon which a trade or business may be distin-
guished from an activity merely engaged in for profit. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Provisions authorizing deductions for business expenses have been 
found in every tax act since 1913. 18 The present Code affords special 
treatment to items of income, expense, and loss attributable to the tax-
payer's trade or business. 19 Despite numerous references to the term 
trade or business,2o neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations pro-
vide a general definition.21 The paucity of legislative and administrative 
guidance has left to the courts the task of defining a trade or business. 
Unfortunately, courts have not reached any consensus. This lack of con-
sensus has resulted in the present state of confusion concerning the essen-
tial characteristics of a trade or business. 
Early decisions22 relied upon the Supreme Court's definition of 
"business" rendered in Flint v. Stone Tracy CO.23 In Flint,24 there was an 
issue as to whether particular companies were "engaged in business," 
and thus subject to the Corporation Tax Law of 1909.25 To define "busi-
ness," the Court referred to the word's dictionary definition.26 Justice 
Day, writing for the Court, noted that business "embraces everything 
18. Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenues, Pub. L. No. 16, § 2(B), 38 
Stat. 114, 167 (1913). The term "business or trade" appeared in the Revenue Act of 
1916. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759 (1916). The 
term "trade or business" first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 
254, § 214(a)(I), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1918). For a discussion of the terms "trade" 
and "business" prior to this period, see Messamer, What Constitutes a Trade or 
Business Under Federal Tax Laws, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 99, 99-108 (1954). 
19. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. 
20. One commentator has noted that the term "trade or business" appears in over 170 
instances in at least 60 different Code sections. Saunders, "Trade or Business, " Its 
Meaning Under the Internal Revenue Code, 12 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 693, 693 (1960). 
21. The Code does provide definitions of trade or business for some specific Code sec-
tions. E.g., I.R.C. § 355(b)(2) (1982) (defines a trade or business in the context of 
distribution of stock and securities of a controlled corporation); !d. § 502(b) (with 
respect to tax exempt organizations, certain activities do not constitute a trade or 
business); Id. § 770 1 (a)(26) (defines trade or business to include "performance of the 
functions of a public office"). Treasury Regulation section 1.5 13-1 (b) is the closest 
attempt by the Treasury Department to define a trade or business. It is stated that 
the term trade or business under section 513 has the same meaning as under section 
162 and "generally includes any activity carried on for the production of income 
from the sale of goods or performance of services." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), T.D. 
7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 168 (1975). 
22. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 41 F.2d 865, 868 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Deering v. Blair, 
23 F.2d 975, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Wilson v. Eisner, 282 F. 38,41 (2d Cir. 1922). 
23. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
24. Id. at 171. 
25. Corporation Tax Law of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909). 
26. Flint, 220 U.S. at 171. 
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about which a person can be employed"27 and is " '[t]hat which occupies 
the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or 
profit'."28 Although often cited in succeeding years,29 the Flint definition 
is not particularly helpful in distinguishing business from nonbusiness 
activity because it is so broad that it encompasses nearly all taxpayer 
activity.30 
In 1940, the Supreme Court addressed the trade or business issue in 
Deputy v. du Pont.3l There, the taxpayer acted as a conduit by which 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company funneled 9,000 shares of its com-
mon stock to nine key executives.32 In furtherance of the transfer plan, 
the taxpayer borrowed 9,000 shares of du Pont Company stock from an-
other holder and then sold the shares to the key executives, who paid 
with funds furnished by the company.33 The loan agreement required 
the taxpayer to reimburse the lender for both the dividends declared 
while the stock was on loan and the tax consequences associated with the 
loan transaction.34 The taxpayer deducted as "ordinary and necessary" 
business expenses nearly $648,000 in costs incurred in carrying out the 
plan. 35 
A majority of the Court accepted, for argument's sake, the tax-
payer's claim that he was engaged in the business of "conserving and 
enhancing his estate,"36 and held that the expenses were not deductible 
because they were not ordinary and necessary expenses of the taxpayer's 
purported businessY Disagreeing with the majority's rationale, Justice 
Frankfurter concurred in the result only. He was unwilling to accept, 
27. ld. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 158). 
28. /d. (quoting BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 273). 
29. See, e.g., Cecil v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1939); Hughes v. Com-
missioner, 38 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1930); Deering v. Blair, 23 F.2d 975, 976 
(D.C. Cir. 1928). 
30. Hughes, 38 F.2d at 758-59. 
31. 308 U.S. 488 (1940). In the years between Flint and du Pont, the Court only ad-
dressed the meaning of "business" in the context of corporate activity. See Ed-
wards v. Chile Copper Co., 270 U.S. 452, 455-56 (1926); Von Baumback v. Sargent 
Land Co., 242 U.S. 503, 516 (1917). 
32. du Pont, 308 U.S. at 490. 
33. ld. at 490-92. For business reasons, the du Pont Company wanted to give shares of 
common stock to the nine members of its newly formed Executive Committee. The 
company, however, held an insufficient number of shares in its treasury to complete 
the transaction. Traditional methods of transferring stock were rejected for eco-
nomic reasons; the issuance of new shares would implicate the preemptive rights of 
existing shareholders and the purchase of 9,000 shares would substantially increase 
the market price per share. The taxpayer, therefore, borrowed 9,000 shares and sold 
1,000 shares to each of the nine key executives. ld. at 490. 
34. /d. at 491-92. The taxpayer entered into two such agreements. The controversy 
before the Court involved the second agreement, which was designed to provide 
shares to repay the lender under the first agreement. ld. 
35. ld. at 492. This sum represents $567,648 in du Pont Company dividends received 
by the taxpayer during the loan period and $80,064 in federal income tax imposed 
on the lender due to the foregoing payment. ld. 
36. ld. at 493-94. 
37. /d. at 496-97. The Court noted that the costs of the transaction arose from the 
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even for the sake of argument, that the taxpayer was engaged in any 
trade or business and wrote: 
[I]t is not enough to incur expenses in the active concern over 
one's own financial interest. " . . . carrying on any trade or 
business," within the contemplation of § 23(a) [now section 
162], involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the 
selling of goods or services. This the taxpayer did not do. 38 
One year later, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the trade or 
business issue avoided by the majority opinion in du Pont. In Higgins v. 
Commissioner,39 the taxpayer held extensive investments in real estate 
and securities which he actively managed from his Paris office.40 The 
taxpayer's New York office handled his accounting matters and executed 
his investment decisions. The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's 
deductions for the incidental expenses associated with the New York of-
fice and contended that personal investment activities can never consti-
tute carrying on a trade or business.41 
Noting that no definition of trade or business had ever been formu-
lated by Congress or the Secretary of the TreasurY,42 the Higgins Court 
acknowledged the definition of "business" stated by the Court in Flint.43 
The Higgins Court, however, found that the context of the Flint decision 
- the Corporation Tax Law of 1909 - made that definition inappropri-
ate to cases involving an individual's tax liability under the Revenue Act 
of 1939.44 The Court concluded that an examination of the facts in each 
case is required to determine whether a taxpayer's activities constitute a 
business.45 Applying this "facts and circumstances" test the Court found 
as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to justify a reversal of 
the appellate court's decision.46 The Court held that no matter how ex-
tensive the work required to manage a personal estate, the mere collec-
tion of interest and dividends and the concomitant record keeping do not 
qualify as a trade or business.47 
The Court reiterated its "facts and circumstances" test in two cases 
decided later in 1941, the same year as Higgins. 48 In neither case did the 
business of the du Pont Company and not any business that the taxpayer may have 
claimed to have engaged in. Id. at 497. 
38. Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
39. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). 
40. /d. 
41. Id. at 214-15. 
42. /d. at 215. 
43. See supra notes 23, 27, 28 and accompanying text. 
44. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217 ("A definition given for such an issue is not controlling in 
this dissimilar inquiry. "). 
45.Id. 
46. Id. at 218. 
47.Id. 
48. United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helver-
ing, 313 U.S. 121 (1941). 
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Court refer to Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services" test. Indeed, the 
"goods or services" test did not resurface in a Supreme Court opinion 
until 1974 in Snow v. Commissioner. 49 In Snow, the taxpayer claimed a 
deduction for his distributive share of losses incurred by a partnership 
formed to develop and market a special purpose incinerator. 50 In the 
year of its formation, the partnership attempted no sales activity. Never-
theless, the partnership incurred substantial expenses that it claimed 
were deductible under section 174, which allows a taxpayer to treat as a 
current expense those research and development costs incurred in con-
nection with the taxpayer's trade or business. 51 In the absence of any 
attempt at sales activity, the Commissioner denied the deduction on the 
basis that the partnership was not engaged in a trade or business. 52 The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 53 
The Court stated that section 174 was enacted to "dilute" Justice 
Frankfurter's concept of a trade or business expressed in his concurring 
opinion in du Pont and thus encourage research and development ex-
penditures.54 The Court therefore found the partnership's lack of sales 
activity to be irrelevant and held that Snow's share of the partnership's 
research and development expenses were deductible. 55 
In contrast to the Supreme Court's neglect of the "goods or serv-
ices" test, three circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals had ex-
plicitly adopted the test by 1943.56 Over the succeeding years more 
courts chose to adhere to Justice Frankfurter's test, 57 including the 
United States Tax Court. 58 
In Barrett v. Commissioner,59 the Internal Revenue Service levied 
self-employment tax on earnings generated by the taxpayer under a con-
sulting agreement.60 The taxpayer received sums pursuant to a contract 
that required him to be available to render consulting services to the 
49. 416 U.S. 500 (1974). 
50. [d. at 501-02. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 501. 
53. [d. at 504. 
54. [d. at 502-03; see infra text accompanying note 147. 
55. [d. at 504. 
56. Daily Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. 
Highland, 124 F.2d 556, 561 (4th Cir. 1942); He1vering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
124 F.2d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 164 (1942). 
57. E.g., Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58, 58 (2d Cir. 1981); Stanton v. Commis-
sioner, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968); McDowell v. Ribicotf, 292 F.2d 174, 178 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). 
58. E.g., Gestrich v. Commissioner, 74 T.e. 525, 529 (1980); Gentile v. Commissioner, 
65 T.C. I, 5-6 (1975); Barrett v. Commissioner, 58 T.e. 284, 290 (1972). Cf 
Fischer v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 164, 171 (1968) (deductions related to airplane 
denied when taxpayer testified that he did not hold himself out as being in the busi-
ness of chartering aircraft). 
59. 58 T.e. 284 (1972). 
60. [d. at 284. 
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company after his retirement. 61 The Tax Court noted that under the 
terms of the contract, the taxpayer was precluded from offering his con-
sulting services to any potential competitor of his former employer.62 
Under a strict reading of Justice Frankfurter's language, the Tax Court 
held that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business because he 
could not hold himself out to "others" as engaged in the selling of "goods 
or services."63 Therefore, the taxpayer was not subject to self-employ-
ment tax.64 
Three years after Barrett, the Tax Court again considered the trade 
or business issue in the context of self-employment tax. In Gentile v. 
Commissioner,65 the Tax Court was concerned with a taxpayer whose 
total reported earnings were attributable to his gambling activities.66 As 
a gambler, Gentile visited race tracks one to four times a week and spent 
a "considerable portion" of his time studying racing forms.67 At no time 
during the period in question did he accept wagers on behalf of others, 
operate a casino, or sell advice on gambling; he gambled solely for 
himself. 68 
The Commissioner, seeking to prove that the taxpayer was engaged 
in a trade or business,69 profferred the following definition of that term: 
"an individual's everyday efforts to earn a living, characterized by con-
tinuity, regularity, and profit motive."70 The Tax Court conceded that 
the definition offered by the Commissioner contained elements of "carry-
ing on any trade or business," but held these elements in themselves were 
insufficient.71 The Tax Court stated that the Supreme Court had, in 
Snow, reaffirmed the vitality of the "goods or services" test as the domi-
nant characteristic of a trade or business.72 The Commissioner's failure 
to establish that Gentile held himself out to others as offering "goods or 
services" proved to be fatal to the Commissioner's case.73 
61. Id. at 285-87. 
62. Id. at 290. 
63.Id. 
64. Code sections 1401 and 1402 subject trade or business income of the taxpayer to 
self-employment tax. For this purpose, "trade or business" has the same meaning as 
under section 162 which provides for the deduction of ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred in carrying on any trade or business. I.R.e. § 1402(c) (West Supp. 
1985). 
65. 65 T.e. 1 (1975). 
66. Id. at 2. The taxpayer reported winnings from dice, cards, private gambling on 
sporting events, and racetrack wagers. Id. 
67.Id. 
68.Id. 
69. The Commissioner's objective was to assess self-employment tax on the taxpayer's 
winnings. See supra note 64. 
70. Gentile, 65 T.C. at 3. 
71. Id. at 4. "A trade or business involves something more than the production of 
income for Federal income tax purposes. Compare sec. 162 with sec. 212." Id. at 4-
5. 
72. Id. at 5. 
73. Id. at 6. The Gentile court noted: "Upon stepping up to the betting window, peti-
tioner was not holding himself out as offering any goods or services to anyone." Id. 
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The Tax Court continued to employ the "goods or services" test 
until its 1983 ruling in Ditunno v. Commissioner.74 Ditunno, like Gentile, 
involved a full time gambler who did not hold himself out as offering any 
goods or gambling services.75 From 1977 through 1979, the taxpayer 
reported approximately $60,000 in winnings per year and deducted 
nearly the same amount in gambling losses.76 Based on Gentile, the 
Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's personal gambling activities 
did not constitute a trade or business and, therefore, the losses generated 
by the taxpayer were not properly deductible to arrive at adjusted gross 
income under section 62( 1).77 The Commissioner characterized the 
losses as itemized deductions subject to the minimum tax on tax prefer-
ence items.78 
The Tax Court took this opportunity to reconsider the "goods or 
services" test and declared the test "overly restrictive."79 According to 
the Ditunno court, the Gentile court's reliance on Snow was misplaced.8o 
Ditunno viewed Snow's reference to Justice Frankfurter's definition of 
trade or business as neither an affirmance nor an adoption of that stan-
dard. 81 According to the Tax Court, the reference was merely an indica-
tion of the Court's desire to select a restrictive definition of trade or 
business for contrast with the more liberal definition that it planned to 
provide for the term as used in section 174.82 The Ditunno court, relying 
on Higgins, held that the proper test of whether an individual is con-
ducting a trade or business "requires an examination of all the facts and 
circumstances involved in each case."83 
In its analysis of the "facts and circumstances," the Tax Court con-
trasted Ditunno's activities with those activities the Supreme Court 
found not to constitute a trade or business. 84 In distinguishing Higgins, 
the Tax Court emphasized that Ditunno was not merely investing in a 
relatively permanent and stable portfolio;85 he was not assured a return 
74. 80 T.e. 362 (1983). 
75. Id. at 363. The court noted that the taxpayer visited the racetrack six days a week, 
year round. Id. 
76. Id. at 364. 
77. Id. at 364-65. 
78. Id. Presently, wagering losses are not subject to minimum tax. 1.R.e. § 55(e)(I)(A) 
(1982). 
79. Ditunno, 80 T.C. at 366. 
80. Id. at 370. 
81. Id. 
82. /d. The dissent considered the majority's claim to be unfounded. Chief Judge Tan-
nenwald stated: "But the fact of the matter is that the Court found it necessary to 
select a standard for comparing section 162 with section 174 and, in so doing, se-
lected Justice Frankfurter's holding-out test. If this does not constitute approval, I 
do not know what does." Id. at 374 (Tannenwald, C.J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
83. Id. at 366-67 (emphasis in original). 
84. Id. at 371-72. 
85. Cj. City Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121, 125 n.3 (1941) (taxpayer-
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when he placed abet. 86 Furthermore, the court noted that Ditunno 
spent most of his time either gambling or studying racing forms, as op-
posed to merely collecting dividends and interest.87 Upon these facts, the 
Tax Court held that full-time gambling qualified as a trade or business.88 
Four months after Ditunno, the Eleventh Circuit, in Steffens v. Com-
missioner,89 implicitly adopted the "goods or services" test.90 There, the 
Commissioner assessed self- employment tax against the taxpayer for his 
work as a corporate director of, and as a consultant to, his former em-
ployer.9\ The Tax Court below, in a decision rendered prior to Ditunno, 
reasoned that the taxpayer was not subject to self-employment tax with 
respect to his consulting activities because his consulting agreement con-
tained an exclusivity clause which precluded him from seeking other con-
sulting engagements.92 Based upon its ruling in Barrett,93 the Tax Court 
concluded that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business be-
cause he did not hold himself out to "others" as selling "goods or 
services. "94 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court and rejected as 
senseless the practice of making a distinction between a taxpayer who 
holds himself out to one employer and a taxpayer who holds himself out 
to many employers.95 The court concluded that the proper focus of the 
trade or business inquiry is the activity generating the clients or custom-
ers, not the number of clients generated.96 
trustee primarily collected interest); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 
(1941) (taxpayer merely collected interest and dividends from his securities). 
86. Ditunno, 80 T.e. at 372. 
87. /d. at 371-72; see supra note 85. 
88. Ditunno, 80 T.e. at 372. 
89. 707 F.2d 478 (lith Cir. 1983). 
90. Id. at 482. It should be noted that it is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit contin-
ues to follow the "goods or services" test. The court affirmed by unpublished order a 
Tax Court decision employing the "facts and circumstances" test. Nipper v. Com-
missioner, 746 F.2d 813 (lith Cir. 1984), affg, 47 T.e.M. (CCH) 136 (1983). This 
holding appears irreconcilable with the "goods or services" test because the case 
involved a full time gambler. Nipper, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 136. 
91. Steffens, 707 F.2d at 480. 
92. Steffens v. Commissioner, 42 T.e.M. (CCH) 1585, 1589 (1981), rev'd, 707 F.2d 478 
(1Ith Cir. 1983). The Tax Court also held that the taxpayer's activity as a director 
did not constitute a trade or business because the taxpayer served only one board 
and never presented himself as generally available to serve on other boards. /d. at 
1588. 
93. Barrett v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 284 (1972); see supra notes 59-64 and accompany-
ing text. 
94. Steffens, 42 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1589. 
95. Steffens, 707 F.2d at 482. Compare Barnett v. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 609 (1978) 
(taxpayer held to be in trade or business when consulting contract contained an 
exclusive service clause that permitted taxpayer to render services outside em-
ployer's city, even though the taxpayer only rendered services to that one company) 
with Barrett v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 284 (1972) (taxpayer held not to be in trade 
or business when consulting contract permitted taxpayer no outside consulting 
work). 
96. Steffens, 707 F.2d at 482; cf Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1981) 
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Holding that the taxpayer was in the trade or business of consulting, 
the court next considered whether the taxpayer's service on a corpora-
tion's board of directors constituted a trade or business. The court first 
noted that serving on a single board satisfied the "goods or services" 
test.97 The court then employed a "facts and circumstances" analysis and 
determined that based upon the nature of the duties of the taxpayer as a 
corporate director and the continuity and regularity of the taxpayer's ac-
tivities, the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business.98 
The first appellate case to consider expressly the Tax Court's rejec-
tion of the "goods or services" test was Gajewski v. Commissioner.99 In 
Gajewski, as in Ditunno, the taxpayer was a full time gambler who did 
not hold himself out as selling "goods or services."loo Unlike Ditunno, 
however, the Second Circuit held that a full time gambler is not in the 
trade or business of gambling because he does not offer "goods or serv-
ices" to the public. 101 The Gajewski court maintained its allegiance to 
the Frankfurter standard for several reasons. Gajewski, like earlier Tax 
Court decisions,102 claimed that the Supreme Court's Snow decision indi-
cated implicit approval of the "goods or services" test.103 The Second 
Circuit noted as additional support for its holding that a majority of the 
circuits had expressed approval of the "goods or services" test either ex-
plicitly or implicitly.l04 Moreover, the Gajewski court labeled the Tax 
("[E]ven though he [Justice Frankfurter] referred to 'others' in his Deputy opinion 
... it is clear that he was distinguishing between managing one's own investments 
and rendering services or selling goods to one or more others. "). 
97. Steffens, 707 F.2d at 482. 
98. Id. at 483. "These duties include being entrusted with the management of the af-
fairs of the corporation while exercising diligence in managing and preserving the 
corporation's assets." Id. The court also noted that the taxpayer had been a director 
of the company since 1949. Id. 
The Tax Court, five months after Steffens, laid to rest the distinction between a 
taxpayer who holds himself out to one employer and a taxpayer who holds himself 
out to many employers. In Hornaday v. Commissioner, the petitioner signed a writ-
ten consulting agreement with his former employer. 81 T.e. 830, 831 (1983). 
Although the petitioner remained available to render consulting services, the com-
pany did not request his services during the years in question. /d. at 833. The 
petitioner, relying on Barrett and Barnett, maintained that he was not engaged in a 
trade or business because he did not offer his services to more than one company. 
Id. at 835. The Tax Court repeated the holding in Ditunno that failure to offer 
"goods or services" to others is insufficient in itself to preclude a finding that the 
taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business and stated that Barrett and Barnett would, 
therefore, no longer be followed. /d. at 837. The court, upon reviewing the "facts 
and circumstances" presented, noted that the taxpayer "stood ready and able to 
render services if requested during those years" and held that the taxpayer was en-
gaged in a trade or business. /d. at 839-40. 
99. 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 (1984). 
100. Id. at 1063. 
101. Id. at 1066-67. 
102. E.g., Gestrich v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 525 (1980); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 
T.C. 1 (1975). 
103. Gajewski, 723 F.2d at 1065. 
104. Id. at 1066 (citing Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326,329 (5th Cir. 1968); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 
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Court's new approach as a "non test" because it does not state which 
"facts and circumstances" indicate the existence of a trade or business. 105 
Against this background, and with the belief that the "goods or services" 
test is fairer to taxpayers than the amorphous "facts and circumstances" 
approach, the Second Circuit concluded that a trade or business is "a 
commercial activity in which a person seeks to earn a livelihood by fur-
nishing goods or services to others for a price [and] [h]olding one's self 
out for such purposes is the universal characteristic of a businessman or 
trader in a free enterprise society."106 
In light of Gajewski, the Tax Court reconsidered its rejection of the 
"goods or services" test. In Groetzinger v. Commissioner,107 the taxpayer 
was also a full time gambler who spent virtually all his time making wa-
gers. 108 Presented with the trade or business issue, the Tax Court reaf-
firmed its use of a "facts and circumstances" analysis and held that the 
gambling activities of the taxpayer constituted a trade or business, thus 
making his losses deductible to arrive at adjusted gross income.109 To 
support its position, the court supplemented the reasoning found in its 
Ditunno decision with two new arguments. First, the Tax Court ques-
tioned whether those circuits claiming to support the "goods or services" 
test truly do. I 10 Citing several circuit court decisions that indicate a wa-
vering adherence to the test, the Groetzinger court stated its uncertainty 
as to how those and other circuits would rule in the future. I II Second, 
the court recognized that a body of case law has developed which holds 
that a taxpayer trading in securities for the purpose of capitalizing on 
short-term market swings is engaged in a trade or business. 112 The court 
found the holdings in these "trader" cases irreconcilable with the "goods 
292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961); Daily Journal Co. v. 
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 
556,561 (4th Cir. 1942); Helvering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156, 158-59 
(3d Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 164 (1942». 
105. Gajewski, 723 F.2d at 1066. 
106.Id. 
107. 82 T.e. 793 (1984), affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985). 
108. Id. at 794 (taxpayer spent 60-80 hours per week on gambling related activities). 
109. Id. at 803 n.26. 
110. Id. at 799. 
111. Id. Compare McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.) (goods or services), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961) and Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 
1941) (goods or services) and Snow v. Commissioner, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(goods or services), rev'd, 416 U.S. 500 (1974) and Daily Journal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 135 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1943) (goods or services) with Commissioner v. Mof-
fat, 373 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1967) (facts and circumstances) and Commissioner v. 
Nubar, 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950) (facts and circumstances) and Walsh v. Com-
missioner, 313 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1963) (facts and circumstances) and Main Line 
Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1963) (facts and circum-
stances) and Purvis v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1976) (facts and cir-
cumstances) and United States v. Keeler, 308 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1962) (facts and 
circumstances) and Wineberg v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963) (facts 
and circumstances). 
112. Groetzinger, 82 T.e. at 800; see infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text. 
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or services" test. 113 The court found no meaningful distinction between a 
gambler and a person speculating on short-term changes in the stock 
market. I 14 
Six months after the Groetzinger decision, the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed the trade or business issue. In Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 115 
the taxpayer was a professional gambler similar to the taxpayers in 
Ditunno and Groetzinger. 116 Holding that gambling for oneself does not 
constitute a trade or business, 117 the court did not address the criticisms 
raised in Groetzinger. Instead, the Sixth Circuit focused on harmonizing 
Higgins with the "goods or services" test} 18 The court agreed with the 
Second Circuit l19 that the Higgins "facts and circumstances" test is a 
non-test because it fails to state which "facts and circumstances" are cru-
cial to the determination that a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness}20 The court concluded that Higgins and the "goods or services" 
test compliment one another; the former stands for the general proposi-
tion that determining whether one is involved in a trade or business is a 
question of fact, while the latter sets forth the minimum facts necessary 
to establish taxpayer involvement in a trade or business.t 21 
The Seventh Circuit, in Groetzinger v. Commissioner,122 is the most 
recent circuit to express a view on the trade or business controversy. In 
affirming the Tax Court's holding below,123 the Seventh Circuit rejected 
the "goods or services" test in favor of a "facts and circumstances" ap-
proach to identifying trade or business activity.t 24 The court claimed 
that the "goods or services" test is of "dubious value as an analytical 
too1."125 To support its opinion, the court made two observations: first, 
only one casel26 outside the gambler context has ever expressly applied 
the "goods or services" test to conclude that the taxpayer was not en-
gaged in a trade or business; 127 and second, in most trade or business 
113. Groetzinger, 82 T.e. at 802. 
114. Id. at 801-02. The Tax Court stated: "The essential nature of these activities is 
identical; to state it simply, one gambles on stocks, the other on dogs. Both bet, or 
trade, solely for their own account and do not enter into any transactions with spe-
cific individuals; rather, their profits or losses depend solely upon their ability to 
predict outcomes in an impersonal and (presumably) nonmanipulatable market or 
pari-mutuel event." Id. 
115. 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985). 
116. Id. at 1149. The taxpayer placed wagers almost daily and gambled only with his 
own money. Id. 
117. Id. at 1151-52. 
118. /d. 
119. Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 88 (1984). 
120. Estate o/Cull, 746 F.2d at lIS!. 
12!. Id. 
122. 771 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). 
123. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
124. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 277. 
125. Id. 
126. Snow v. Commissioner, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). 
127. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 272. 
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cases the taxpayer's status as one providing goods or services is not at 
issue. 128 Moreover, the court stated that a literal reading of the test re-
quires the taxpayer to hold himself out to "others" and thus would ex-
clude from trade or business status employees working for a single 
employer, despite settled case law and a Code provision that provide for 
such status for employees. 129 
The Seventh Circuit also declared that the "goods or services" test is 
misfocused. 130 The court conducted an obfuscated analysis of Code sec-
tion 62 131 and concluded that a trade or business should be broadly de-
fined as "any person's occupation or livelihood."132 Because the "goods 
or services" test does not focus on identifying occupations or livelihoods, 
the court rejected it in favor of the "facts and circumstances" test. 133 
III. ANALYSIS 
The major cause of the controversy concerning the propriety of the 
"goods or services" test is the lack of a clear holding on the matter by the 
Supreme Court. The present state of case law leaves those courts follow-
ing the "goods or services" test as adamant in their claims of Supreme 
Court approval as the Tax Court is in rejecting the test. 134 These con-
flicting positions are primarily founded upon differing interpretations of 
Higgins v. Commissioner135 and Snow v. Commissioner.136 
The Supreme Court in Higgins held that the determination of 
whether a taxpayer is "carrying on any trade or business" requires an 
examination of the facts in each case. 137 Had this decision been rendered 
128. Id. at 276 n.9. 
129. Id. at 273, 276. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
130. 771 F.2d at 276-77. 
131. Code section 62(1) allows non-employee trade or business expenses to be deducted 
in arriving at adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 62(1) (1982). Code section 62(2) pro-
vides the same treatment for certain trade or business expenses incurred by employ-
ees. Id. § 62(2). 
132. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 273. 
133. Id. at 277. 
134. Compare Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1152 (6th Cir. 1984) 
("The continued vitality and importance of [the 'goods or services' test] has been 
acknowledged in a number of circumstances. See, e.g., Snow v. Commissioner 
.... "), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985) and Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 
F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Although the Court has never expressly adopted 
the 'goods and services' requirement, it has been implicitly approved. For example, 
in Snow v. Commissioner . ... "), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 (1984) with Groetz-
inger v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 793, 798 (1984) ("In announcing a review of all the 
facts approach, the [Higgins] Court implicitly rejected various other attempts, in-
cluding that of Justice Frankfurter, to formulate a precise definition of [trade or 
business]."), affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985) and Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 
T.C. 362, 369 (1983) ("Thus in Higgins, the Supreme Court set forth a test of fact 
and circumstance. . . and also established that no particular fact or set of facts was 
sufficient, by itself, to satisfy that test."). 
135. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). 
136. 416 U.S. 500 (1974). 
137. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217. 
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before Justice Frankfurter announced his "goods or services" test in Dep-
uty v. du Pont,138 perhaps there would be less confusion over the impact 
of Higgins. Higgins, however, was rendered one year after du Pont, yet it 
did not allude to the "goods or services" test despite the lower court's 
reliance in part on Justice Frankfurter's language. 139 From this omis-
sion, a cogent argument is made that Higgins was an implicit rejection of 
the "goods or services" test. l40 
Such an argument fails to consider two important aspects of the de-
cision. First, Justice Reed authored the Court's Higgins opinion in 
which Justice Frankfurer joined. 141 It is unlikely that Justice Reed, who 
earlier joined in Justice Frankfurter's du Pont concurrence, 142 and Justice 
Frankfurter himself, would so soon abandon the "goods or services" test 
without comment. Second, the facts viewed as dispositive by the Court 
in Higgins are similar to those which would be dispositive under a "goods 
or services" approach. The Court held that the taxpayer's activities, 
which consisted of keeping records and collecting interest and dividends 
through managerial attention, were insufficient as a matter of law to con-
stitute a trade or business. 143 Such activities also would fall far short of 
providing any "goods or services," and thus fail a "goods or services" 
analysis as a matter of law. 144 In light of the authorship of the Higgins 
opinion, the participation of Justice Frankfurter in that opinion, and the 
similarity of the results of that opinion to the results which would have 
been achieved under an explicit "goods or services" analysis, it is tenuous 
to claim that Higgins stands for a rejection of the "goods or services" 
test. 145 
Although Higgins has been misinterpreted as a rejection of the 
"goods or services" test, Snow 146 has been misinterpreted as approval of 
the test. In Snow, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that the 
138. 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
139. Higgins v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 795,797 (2d Cir. 1940), affd, 312 U.S. 212 
(1941). 
140. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 793, 798 (1984), affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 
1985); Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 362,369 (1983). 
141. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 213. 
142. 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
143. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218. 
144. By giving managerial attention to his personal investments, Higgins did not hold 
himself out as selling goods or rendering services. One commentator suggests that 
all security investor cases, starting with Higgins, could be reconciled by focusing on 
the failure of the investor to offer any services to the public. Bolling & Carper, The 
Evo/ving Definition of "Trade or Business':' Ditunno and Beyond, 63 TAXES 73, 78 
(1985). 
145. Cf Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In referring to 
the necessity for 'examination of the facts in each case' the Higgins Court did not 
establish a new standard. Nor did it imply that a person not offering goods or 
services ... could be carrying on a trade or business.") (footnote omitted), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 (1984); Helvering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156, 159 
(3d Cir. 1941) (Higgins does "not necessarily detract from the weight of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's conception. "), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 164 (1942). 
146. Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). 
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purpose of section 174, which allows a taxpayer to treat as expenses those 
research and development costs incurred in connection with his trade or 
business, was: 
to dilute some of the conception of "ordinary and necessary" 
business expenses under § 162(a) ... adumbrated by Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in Deputy v. Du Pont 
[sic] ... where he said the section in question (old § 23(a» 
"involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the sell-
ing of goods or services."147 
The Snow opinion raises the question as to the implication to be 
drawn from the Court's use of Justice Frankfurter's language. Some 
courts have viewed Snow as implicit approval of the "goods or services" 
test under section 162 because the Court chose to characterize the term 
"trade or business" under that section by referring to Justice Frank-
furter's language. 148 The context in which the test is quoted, however, 
does not support any claim of approval. The Court's reference to Justice 
Frankfurter's language is not expressed in the context of the Supreme 
Court's view of its relative merits. 149 Instead, the Court merely identifies 
the "goods or services" test as the impetus for Congressional passage of 
section 174.150 Whatever this may imply about Congress's view of the 
"goods or services" test or the Court's view of Congress's motivation for 
enacting section 174, it provides no insight into the Court's position on 
the use of the "goods or services" test outside the context of section 
174.151 Courts claiming to find approval of the "goods or services" test 
in the Supreme Court's neutral usage of Justice Frankfurter's language, 
in effect, divine meaning from the Court's failure to engage in obiter dic-
tum and thoroughly denounce the test while discussing it in the context 
of section 174.152 
147. Id. at 502-03. 
148. See, e.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 (1984). The Tax Court adhered to such a 
position, see Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.e. I, 5 (1975), until its Ditunno deci-
sion. Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 360, 370 (1983). 
149. Snow, 416 U.S. at 502-03. 
ISO. /d. 
lSI. See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 793, 798-99 n.17 (1984) (A "fair read-
ing" of Snow does not suggest that the Court intended to do more than compare the 
liberal allowance provisions of section 174 with the generally more restrictive re-
quirements of section 162.), affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985); Ditunno v. Com-
missioner, 80 T.e. 362, 370 (1983) ("[T]he Snow reference to Justice Frankfurter's 
concurrence in Deputy v. du Pont does not indicate that the Supreme Court intended 
... to approve his definition."). 
152. Moreover, some critics have found significance in Justice Douglas's use of the word 
"adumbrated" to describe Justice Frankfurter's test. See, e.g., Roth, Trade or Busi-
ness Requirement of Sec. 162 and the Deductibility of Preoccupancy Expenses In-. 
curred in Rental Real Estate Projects, 57 TAXES 33, 41 n.79 (1979) ("adumbrated" 
indicated that the Court viewed Justice Frankfurter's language as clouding the is-
sue); Groetzinger, 82 T.e. at 798-99 n.17 ("We also note that in Snow, the Court 
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The significance to be attached to Higgins and Snow is not the only 
point of contention in the "trade or business" controversy. Although 
nine United States Courts of Appeals claim adherence to the "goods or 
services" test,153 the Tax Court has questioned whether these circuits ac-
tually apply the test. 154 In Groetzinger v. Commissioner,155 the Tax 
Court listed a number of cases rendered by "goods or services" test juris-
dictions that ignored the test and instead quoted the language of 
Higgins. 156 
The absence of Justice Frankfurter's language is easily explained in 
most cases. For example, in United States v. Keeler,157 the existence of a 
trade or business was uncontested, thus reference to the "goods or serv-
ices" test was unnecessary. ISS The issue before the court was whether a 
debt incurred by the taxpayer was sufficiently related to his trade or busi-
ness to constitute a business bad debt.ls9 Similarly, in Walsh v. Commis-
sioner,160 the court considered whether a loan in default was sufficiently 
related to the taxpayer's existing business to constitute a business bad 
debt. 161 In Wineberg v. Commissioner,162 the existence of a trade or busi-
referred to Justice Frankfurter's test as having been 'adumbrated.' "), affd, 771 
F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985). 
153. Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 (1984); Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 
1364 (10th Cir. 1982); Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 
292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961); Daily Journal Co. v. 
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 
556, 561 (4th Cir. 1942). The Eleventh Circuit adopted the "goods or services" test 
in Steffens v. Commissioner, but the current status of the test in that circuit is un-
clear. Compare Steffens v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 478, 481-82 (1Ith Cir. 1983) 
(implicitly adopting the "goods or services" test) with Nipper v. Commissioner, 746 
F.2d 813 (lIth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming by unpublished order a Tax Court 
decision finding a professional gambler to be engaged in a trade or business), affg, 
47 T.e.M. (CCH) 136 (1983). 
154. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 793, 798-99 (1984), affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
155. Id. at 793. 
156. Id. at 799 & n.19. The Tax Court found the following cases to be decided on the 
"facts and circumstances" test rather than on the "goods or services" test: Purvis v. 
Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1976); Commissioner v. Moffat, 373 F.2d 
844 (3d Cir. 1967); Walsh v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1963); Wineberg 
v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963); Main Line Distributors, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 321 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Keeler, 308 F.2d 424 
(9th Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950). Id. at 799 
n.19. 
157. 308 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1962). 
158. /d. at 428. 
159. Id. at 429. The court held that the taxpayer's loans to a Canadian corporation were 
not sufficiently connected to his industrial laundry business in Seattle, Washington 
to constitute business bad debt upon their default. Id. at 430. 
160. 313 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1963). 
161. Id. at 391. The court held that loans made to an engineering company were not 
related to the taxpayer's business of selling paper. Id. at 392. 
162. 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963). 
124 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
ness was at issue. 163 Although the "goods or services" test was not men-
tioned, the court based its holding that the taxpayer's timber sales 
constituted a trade or business upon its factual finding that the taxpayer 
operated under the name "Wineberg Timber Company" and used means 
other than newspaper advertising to attract customers. 164 The court thus 
applied the "goods or services" test without characterizing it as sUCh. 165 
Although the cases cited in Groetzinger do not fully support the Tax 
Court's contention that those courts claiming adherence to the "goods or 
services" test are inconsistent in its use, a few cases do support the con-
tention that in one area the test has not been used by any court. 166 No 
court has employed the test when faced with the issue of whether a tax-
payer is engaged in the trade or business of trading in securities (trader 
cases).167 Instead, courts have looked to distinguish trading from invest-
ing, the former being a business and the latter being merely the produc-
tion of income. 168 To this end, courts generally employ the functional 
standard elucidated by the Tax Court in Liang v. Commissioner: 169 
The distinction between an investment account and a trading 
account is that in the former, securities are purchased to be 
held for capital appreciation and income, usually without re-
gard to short-term developments that would influence the price 
of securities on the daily market. In a trading account, securi-
ties are bought and sold with reasonable frequency in an en-
deavor to catch the swings in the daily market movements and 
163. Id. at 160. 
164. Id. at 162-63. 
165. In Commissioner v. Moffat, 373 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1967) (also cited in Groetzinger, 
82 T.e. at 799) the taxpayer leased to a corporation land with coal deposits. Moffat, 
373 F.2d at 845. The court held that leasing the land constituted a trade or business 
and that defaulted loans made by the taxpayer to the lessee were business bad debts. 
Id. at 847. Although the court did not mention the "goods or services" test, it 
stressed that the taxpayer spent a significant portion of his time attending to the 
proper operation of his coal land. Id. As such, the taxpayer was holding himself 
out as offering his services as a lessor of property. See Bolling & Carper, The Evolv-
ing Definition of "Trade or Business": Ditunno and Beyond, 63 TAXES 73, 77 (1984). 
That the taxpayer only held himself out to one tenant should be irrelevant to the 
trade or business issue. See Fegan v. Commissioner, 71 T.e. 791, 814 (1974) (lessor 
of even a single parcel of real estate can be in a trade or business); cf Steffens v. 
Commissioner, 707 F.2d 478, 482 (lith Cir. 1983) (that taxpayer only held himself 
out to one employer is irrelevant to trade or business determination); Grosswald v. 
Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1981) (illogical to distinguish between a tax-
payer holding himself out to one or many employers). 
166. Purvis v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1976); Main Line Distributors, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Nubar, 185 
F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950). 
167. The only court to consider the "goods or services" test in the "trader" context dis-
tinguished du Pont on its facts and, therefore, held its use inappropriate. Fuld v. 
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 465, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1943). 
168. E.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Levin v. United 
States, 597 F.2d 760, 765 (Ct. CI. 1979); Purvis, 530 F.2d at 1334. 
169. 23 T.e. 1040 (1955). 
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profit thereby on a short-term basis.170 
The application of the "goods or services" test in the trader context 
would be dispositive to the trade or business issue. In common parlance, 
securities are not goods and a trader provides no services. Yet, the dis-
positive effect of the test may be the reason why lower courts have not 
utilized it. Although the Supreme Court has yet to find a taxpayer to be 
in the trade or business of trading in securities, the Court alluded to this 
possibility several years before the formulation of the "goods or services" 
test.J71 Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in du Pont 172 
and the holding in Higgins,173 the Court in Spreckels v. Commissioner174 
implicitly reaffirmed the possibility that a trader in securities could be in 
a trade or business. There, the Court assumed that the taxpayer was in 
the trade or business of trading in securities and held that the commis-
sion expenses incurred were not deductible under the predecessor of sec-
tion 162.175 The Court did not mention the "goods or services" test and 
implicitly rejected a broad reading of Higgins which seemingly would 
preclude all personal investment activity from being treated as business 
activity.176 In light of the clear signal given by the Supreme Court, the 
absence of the "goods or services" test in lower court decisions in the 
trader context is not surprising because use of the "goods or services" 
test would eliminate any possibility of a trader qualifying for trade or 
business status, a possibility the Supreme Court has not foreclosed. 177 
170. Id. at 1043. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the relevant considerations in deter-
mining whether the taxpayer is a "trader" include "the taxpayer's investment in-
tent, the nature of the income to be derived from the activity, and the frequency, 
extent, and regularity of the taxpayer's securities transactions." Moller, 721 F.2d at 
813. 
171. Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 134 (1935). A taxpayer who "devotes the major 
portion of his time to speculating on the stock exchange may treat losses thus in-
curred as having been sustained in the course of a trade or business." Id. at 139 
(dictum). 
172. 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
173. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). 
174. 315 U.S. 626 (1942). 
175. Id. at 627. 
176. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218. 
177. Although not dealing with the issue of a trader in securities, the Court's decision in 
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963) would also lend support to the view 
that a "trader" can be engaged in a trade or business. The Whipple Court was faced 
with the issue of whether a taxpayer had proven trade or business status by virtue of 
his furnishing regular services to several companies of which he was a substantial 
owner. The Court held that devoting time and energy to the affairs of a corporation, 
in itself, does not constitute a trade or business. The income generated by the tax-
payer, though substantially the result of his own efforts, is nevertheless income dis-
tinctive to the process of investing and legally arises as a result of the successful 
operation of the corporation and not as a result of any trade or business of the 
taxpayer. Id. at 202. 
Applying this principle to the "trader" context, it can be argued that the nature 
of the income generated by the "trader" does not legally arise from the successful 
operation of the investee corporation. Rather, the trader's income is the result of 
the taxpayer's ability to buy or sell securities at opportune moments. 
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The pragmatic approach taken by courts in the trader cases should 
not be viewed as support for the abandonment of the "goods or services" 
test in other contexts lacking the unique case history and characteristics 
of the trader cases. The goal of any court deciding whether to eliminate 
the "goods or services" test should be to select the approach that will 
best distinguish an activity merely engaged in for profit from one rising 
to the level of a trade or business. 178 The existence of an exception to the 
use of the "goods or services" test has no relevance to that selection. 
The "goods or services" test has the advantage of satisfying two 
maxims of statutory construction: (1) in the absence of a clear Congres-
sional definition of a term, "the words of statutes - including revenue 
acts - should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday 
senses"; 179 and (2) deductions are a matter oflegislative grace and should 
be construed narrowly. ISO The term trade or business in common, every-
day usage conjures up the image of a person offering "goods or services" 
for sale, not a person betting on pari-mutuel races. lSI Furthermore, the 
results attainable under the "goods or services" test are more narrowly 
confined than under the "facts and circumstances" test. IS2 
Pragmatically, the majority approach requiring the taxpayer to pass 
both the "goods or services" and "facts and circumstances" tests is 
favorable to a singular "facts and circumstances" analysis. As the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits properly state, a court applying the "facts and 
circumstances" test is left with the task of determining which "facts and 
circumstances" are sufficient to constitute a trade or business. ls3 In their 
analyses, courts primarily have focused upon the extent, continuity, and 
178. Compare I.R.e. § 162 (1982) (trade or business expense) with 1.R.e. § 212 (1982) 
(non trade or nonbusiness expense). The Court's decision in Higgins created an ineq-
uitable situation in which the income earned from a profit seeking activity, such as 
the management of investments, was taxable, yet the expenses associated with the 
activity were not deductible. Congress chose to remedy this inequity by creating a 
separate deduction for nontrade and nonbusiness activity rather than liberalizing 
the requirements for trade or business status. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 56-
753, § 121, 56 Stat. 798, 819 (1942); see H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
43, 46, reprinted in 1942-2 e.B. 372, 410. 
179. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1,6 
(1947). 
180. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). The Seventh Circuit apparently rejects this maxim be-
cause it explicitly holds that "trade or business" status should be construed broadly. 
Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1985). 
18\. See Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Holding one's 
self out for such puposes [as selling goods or services] is the universal characteristic 
of a businessman or trader in a free enterprise society."), cerl. denied, 105 S. Ct. 88 
(1984). 
182. Compare Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984) ("goods or 
services" test applied - individual gambler not in trade or business), cert. denied, 
\05 S. Ct. 2701 (1985) with Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 799 (1984) 
("goods or services" test not applied - individual gambler is in trade or business), 
affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985). 
183. Estate of Cull, 746 F.2d at 1151; Gajewski, 723 F.2d at 1066-67. 
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regularity of the taxpayer's activities. 184 Such ambiguous terms offer no 
guidance to the taxpayer, the courts, or the Internal Revenue Service as 
to how extensive, continuous, or regular an activity must be to satisfy the 
"facts and circumstances" test. Use of this test effectively turns every 
section 212 income producing activity into an inchoate section 162 trade 
or business activity, for, as Judge Sterrett of the United States Tax Court 
stated, under a "facts and circumstances" approach, "almost any sec. 
212 activity can be transformed into a sec. 162 activity by intensification 
of the taxpayer's participation in the activity."18s As a result of this un-
certainty, needless litigation has occurred and is bound to continue -
litigation that would be avoidable by the use of the "goods or services" 
test. 186 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the important role the term "trade or business" plays in the 
American scheme of taxation, neither the Code nor the Treasury Regula-
tions have attempted to define what is meant by the term. From the 
earlier broad "livelihood" definition supplied and later rejected by the 
Supreme Court, a more restrictive two-test approach developed. This 
approach requires the taxpayer first to show that he is holding himself 
out as selling "goods or services." If this showing is made, the taxpayer 
must then pass the "facts and circumstances" test which weighs such 
factors as the extent, continuity, and regularity of the activity. 
184. E.g., Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1982) (requires tax-
payer to show extensive or repeated activity over a substantial period of time); Reese 
v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1980) (lack of continuity and fre-
quency in an endeavor is "strong indicia" that the taxpayer is not engaged in a trade 
or business); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.) (trade or business 
refers to "extensive activity over a substantial period of time"), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 919 (1961). 
185. Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538,543 n.8 (1983) (dictum). For example, 
assume that a taxpayer devotes his full attention to studying real estate market 
trends by attending real estate seminars and by gathering population expansion 
data. Based on these efforts, the taxpayer purchases parcels of real estate to hold for 
long-term appreciation rather than for sale. Is this taxpayer engaged in a trade or 
business? An application of the "goods or services" test would yield a negative 
response; the taxpayer did not hold himself out as selling "goods or services" when 
he purchased realty for long-term appreciation. Under a "facts and circumstances" 
approach, however, the result is not so clear. The taxpayer may not have had fre-
quent purchases or sales, but he did devote his full energy to the endeavor on a 
continuous and regular basis. Orbach & White, How to Establish Existence of a 
Trade or Business in Light of Recent Conflicting Decisions, 13 TAX'N fOR LAW. 38, 
43 (1984). 
186. The Seventh Circuit in adopting the "facts and circumstances" test noted that most 
often the "goods or services" criteria have not been at issue in trade or business 
litigation. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 272, 276 n.9 (7th Cir. 1985). 
The court fails to consider that the reason for the dearth of cases turning on the 
"goods or services" test may be that a taxpayer can determine for himself whether 
he has met the criteria. If he has not, then litigating a tax assessment becomes 
pointless. 
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Recently, the United States Tax Court and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have rejected the "goods or services" 
element of the two-pronged approach as being overly restrictive. The 
courts base their conclusion primarily upon the Supreme Court decision 
in Higgins v. Commissioner, a trade or business case in which the Court 
stated that a determination of the existence of a trade or business requires 
an examination of the facts in each case. In contrast, the Second and 
Sixth Circuits find Higgins an un persuasive reason to reject the "goods or 
services" test because courts normally must consider the facts in each 
case. The issue remains which facts are necessary to constitute a trade or 
business. The "goods or services" test is a major step in resolving that 
issue. 
Continued use of the "goods or services" test can be supported by 
reference to two common maxims of statutory construction: Words of a 
statute should be given their ordinary meanings and tax deductions 
should be narrowly construed. "Holding one's self out" and selling 
"goods or services" are commonly recognized characteristics of a person 
engaged in a trade or business as the term is understood in its ordinary, 
everyday sense. Further, because trade or business status creates oppor-
tunities for deductions, the term should be narrowly construed. The 
"goods or services" test permits fewer activities to be considered a trade 
or business than an open "facts and circumstances" analysis. 
The maxims aside, the most compelling reason to continue the use 
of the "goods or services" test is that it offers a degree of certainty that is 
lacking in a "facts and circumstances" analysis. By its nature, a "facts 
and circumstances" approach leads to confusion for the taxpayer, the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the courts. How "extensive" must an ac-
tivity be? How "continuous" or "regular"? Reasonable people can and 
will differ over such questions. Taxpayers will exploit this uncertainty in 
an attempt to create a set of "facts and circumstances" that some court 
may construe as indicative of a trade or business. Needless litigation has 
occurred and will continue unless the "goods or services" test is applied 
consistently in all courts. 
Wayne Michael Willoughby 
